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INTRODUCTION
Many problems in public economics, in particular the voluntary provision of public goods, require appropriate institutional mechanisms to achieve a burden sharing that is perceived to be "fair" by the relevant stakeholders.
1 As such, cooperation on the provision of public goods is particularly challenging if individual preferences for burden sharing schemes differ among heterogeneous agents. Individual perceptions on what constitutes a fair distribution of cooperation gains from the provision of a public good may depend on agents' initial roles within a group of heterogeneous players, but also on issues regarding procedural fairness, i.e.
under which circumstances and how these different positions accrue. That is, preferences for burden sharing schemes may depend on whether a person considers its current individual position within a society being determined mainly by its own decisions and achievements or rather as exogenously given. The accountability principle as a prominent concept within the theory of economic fairness, for instance, is inspired by ideas of proportionality and responsibility. It requires "that a person's entitlement or fair allocation (e.g., of income) varies in proportion to the relevant variables which he can influence (e.g., work effort), but not according to those which he cannot reasonably influence (e.g., a physical handicap)" (Konow 1996: p.14) . Following this idea, a random allocation of different initial positions within a group of agents may foster claims for a fairness norm tending to equalize payoffs whereas an allocation based on individual efforts may rather provoke a distribution rule that assigns equal contributions to all types of players.
Against this background, we show in a related paper that the equal-payoff rule outperforms other distribution rules as well as the voluntary contribution mechanism in a public goods game when randomly allocated benefits from the public good differ between agents (Kesternich et al. 2014) . Specifically, we investigate the performance of mechanisms which first require agents to agree upon a common group provision level of the public good (via implementing the minimum of proposals from group members, i.e. the smallest common denominator), before this is allocated across agents according to some predetermined burden sharing rule, without allowing for a direct redistribution of initial endowments. While the identified dominance of the payoff-equalizing rule is consistent with inequality-averse players (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999) , it is noteworthy that payoff-equalization can be achieved already for low levels of total public good provision since agents start with equal endowments. This is different when agents are heterogeneous with respect to endowments, a clearly highly realistic setting.
This paper experimentally tests the performance of rule-based contribution mechanisms relative to a voluntary contribution scheme (VCM) under endowment heterogeneities. In a repeated 4-player public goods game, we particularly focus on the impact of the procedure by which heterogeneous endowments are allocated to the respective players. The minimum contribution rules are inspired by two different fairness norms: equality in contributions and equality in payoffs. While the former norm may serve as a simple focal point which allows players to easily coordinate on contributions, the latter norm leads to a more differentiated burden regime but may be attractive if individuals were inequality-averse (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999 , Bolton and Ockenfels 2000 , Charness and Rabin 2002 . In order to account for procedural fairness we distinguish between a random-and an effort-based allocation of individual endowments to mimic various underlying procedures leading to initial heterogeneity within a group. One may expect the equal-payoff rule to lose some attractiveness if endowment heterogeneities were earned rather than randomly determined: the equal-payoff scheme requires larger contributions from rich players, while potentially existing inequality-aversion of players with high endowment may be reduced due to the effort-based allocation of endowments. The experiment in this paper may, thus, be interpreted as a "robustness check" for the efficiency increasing effects of burden sharing schemes, in particular of the equal-payoff rule.
Our experimental results indicate that the efficiency gains from rule-based contribution mechanisms relative to VCM are limited when different endowment levels are randomly allocated. Neither an equal-payoff nor an equal-contribution scheme lead to significantly larger provision levels of the public good, while they clearly affect the distribution of contributions. This finding stands in stark contrast to our previous findings. Together we can therefore conclude that different dimensions of heterogeneity, i.e. endowments vs. marginal benefits, substantially influence fairness perceptions and therewith the performance of specific distributional rule-based mechanism.
Interestingly, this picture changes under effort allocation of endowments: here, both rulebased contribution schemes generate larger average profits than VCM. The difference between effort-based and random allocation thereby is in part driven by the different behavior under the VCM: here, we observe a substantially smaller average contribution under effort-based allocation than under random allocation which originates from lower contributions by agents with high endowments. That is, voluntary contributions by highly-endowed players are reduced if those feel they deserved the higher income. Under effort, rule-based contribution schemes therefore successfully counteract coordination failures and typical downward trends in contributions in VCM.
However, the allocation procedure also affects the behavior in the different burden sharing mechanisms. When the equal-contribution rule is applied, agents with low endowment make lower minimum proposals under effort-based than under random allocation, thereby "accepting" disadvantageous inequality. Differently, agents with high endowment tend to increase their minimum proposal under the equal-payoff rule when comparing effort-based with random allocation. Overall, however, the equal-payoff rule under endowment heterogeneity lifts less than half of the possible efficiency gains across players. In a robustness check, we consider an increase in marginal benefits (for low-type agents) whichunder the equal-payoff rule -would benefit both players: in it, we do not see enhanced coordination. As such, our results indicate that the performance of specific rule-based mechanisms is limited in the presence of endowment heterogeneities among players.
The paper is structured as follows: We summarize related literature in Section 2, before laying out the theoretical predictions for our treatments in Section 3. Section 4 explains the experimental design, before the experimental results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
RELATED LITERATURE
This paper is related to several recent studies on contributions mechanisms that rely on a smallest common denominator rule have been found in the literature (e.g., Orzen 2008 , Dannenberg et al. 2014 ) to be effective in enhancing cooperation gains in homogeneous settings or under heterogeneity with respect to benefits from the public good (Kesternich et al. 2014) . However, these studies did not investigate endowment heterogeneities. The literature on the impact of endowment heterogeneities in a public goods context largely focuses on contribution behavior in traditional VCM schemes. It is found to be sensitive to the distribution of initial wealth but also to be affected by the endowment's origin and the reason for endowment heterogeneity among agents -thereby motivating our study on the performance of different distribution rules in rule-based mechanisms.
In a meta-analysis on the experimental literature on the voluntary public goods provision Zelmer (2003) finds endowment heterogeneity among agents to have a significantly negative impact on contribution behavior. Experimental results from a prisoner's dilemma experiment with heterogeneous initial endowments but homogeneous benefits suggest that subjects earning their endowments contribute more to the joint project when they are matched with subjects whose endowment is randomly allocated (Spraggon and Oxoby 2009) . In contrast, studies by Chan et al. (1996 Chan et al. ( , 1999 and Buckley and Croson (2006) The literature on the impact of the origin of endowment differences on individual behavior in public goods games appears ambiguous. On the one hand, Harrison and El Mouden (2011) report that the requirement for endowments to be earned through labor reduces cooperation in the public goods game among a subset of participants (those who were not familiar with game theory). On the other hand, Cherry et al. (2005) find no effect of the origin of endowments (windfall vs. earned) on contributions. Reinstein and Riener (2012) show in a charitable giving experiment that the probability of donating decreases if endowments are earned in contrast of being randomly allocated. In the same vain, Cherry (2001), Cherry et al. (2002) , and Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) observe that selfish behavior in a dictator game significantly increases when the money has to be earned in a task previous to the genuine experiment.
Our study on the performance of different distribution-rules under endowment heterogeneity is further related to a stream of the experimental literature which aims at tying contribution behavior to social norms based on different fairness principles. Reuben and Riedl (2013) 
TREATMENT DESCRIPTION AND THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS
The experimental design includes several treatments that vary along two important dimensions: (i) we study different institutions which may reduce free-riding incentives when agents are heterogeneous with respect to income, and (ii) we investigate how the performance of these institutions depends on the way income positions are allocated, i.e. randomly or based on effort.
Along the first dimension, we test in particular two rule-based contribution schemes that are inspired by different notions of distributional fairness, i.e. equality in contributions (eqcont) and equality in payoffs (eqpay) and compare them to the standard voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM).
The payoff to player , , is determined by a linear public goods game and given by
where marks the initial individual endowment, the individual contribution to the public good, the marginal benefit from the joint project and = ∑ =1 the aggregated provision level of the public good.
Players in our experimental setting differ by their initial endowment: each group of four players ( = 4) consists of two low-type players with an endowment of = 10 and two Full equalization of income would require
In eqpay, given = 10 and = 30, = 0.4, this is only possible if ≥ 40 where With these definitions of the treatments, we turn to the theoretical predictions. We concentrate on payoff-maximizing preferences. The predictions are graphically summarized in Figure 1 .
In the VCM, theory clearly predicts full free-riding and zero contributions in the Nash equilibrium with individual earnings = and = .
In all burden sharing schemes, the same free-riding argument leads agents to contribute exactly the minimum level, = . Anticipating this, agents consider their potential impact on payoffs from suggesting . Their suggestion only has effect if it is binding, i.e.
= .
It follows that, e.g. in eqcont, low-type players' payoff is increasing in such that they have a weakly dominant strategy to suggest = = 80. If agents prefer to equalize payoffs they can make use of this mechanism in order to equalize their earnings by adjusting their minimum proposals. To reach the highest possible equal payoffs under this burden sharing scheme, agents have to choose the contributions = 10, = 30 which result in = = 32. This would be possible, for instance, if all agents agree upon = 40 and high-types voluntarily contribute more than their minimum contribution level. 5 The highest possible payoffs with equal contributions ( = = 10) under the equal-payoff rule are = 16 and = 36. To achieve this allocation, subjects could, for instance, agree on = 20 and low-types voluntarily contribute more.
complicated than in eqcont (as well as compared to the treatments in Kesternich et al. 2014, where players had homogenous endowments).
Finally, in MPCR-eqpay, low-type players again have weakly dominant strategy to suggest = , while high-type agents would be predicted to suggest = 44 if low-types would suggest at least ≥ 40 (again see Figure 1 ). For any proposal from low-type players < 40 , high-type players prefer = 0. Therefore, the payoff dominant equilibrium in MPCR-eqpay is characterized by = 44, = 10, = 12 which results in = 35.2 and = 35.6. 6
Note that we also vary the procedure of allocating the subject's endowments: it is allocated either randomly or according to the performance in an effort-related task. For payoff maximizing agents, the theoretical predictions are not to be sensitive to the endowments' origin. But given the experimental literature on earned versus windfall endowments (see Section 2) there are reasonable doubts on the hypothesis that the performance of rule-based contribution schemes may not be sensitive to the way how the endowment emerges. Our design, thus, aims at investigating whether the efficiency gains through those schemes are also observed when subjects have to show effort for earning endowment.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We conducted the experiment at the MaXLab laboratory of the University of Magdeburg in Germany with 336 students from various academic disciplines in October 2012 and July 2013. We ran 14 sessions with 24 subjects each. We used ORSEE (Greiner 2004) for recruiting and z-tree software (Fischbacher 2007) for programming. Subjects of each session were divided randomly into six groups with four players with two high-type and two low-type agents. The group composition remained fixed throughout the experiment (partner matching).
At the beginning of each session, participants went through a set of neutrally-worded experimental instructions (see appendix) with verbal descriptions of the game and numerical examples. These instructions also contained some control questions to ensure that every participant understood the game. After that, the experiment was run on the computer.
Information on player's type (high-type or low-type player), contributions (in tokens) and payoffs (in Labdollars LD) was provided via screen. The four subjects of one group received 6 The highest possible payoffs with equal contributions ( = = 10) under the equal-payoff rule with heterogeneous marginal benefits are = 32 and = 36. To achieve this allocation, subjects could, for instance, agree on = 20 and low-types voluntarily contribute more.
full information on minimum proposals, individual and average contributions and payoffs within their group. Furthermore, each subject knew which group member was a high-type and which was a low-type player. The experimental design is summarized in Table 1 .
We consider seven different treatments. Each treatment was conducted in two sessions, we have 12 independent observations per treatment. In three of the seven treatments (R-VCM, Reqcont, R-eqpay) subjects were randomly chosen to be a low-or a high-type player at the beginning of the experiment. In four treatments (E-VCM, E-eqcont, E-eqpay, E-MPCReqpay), the performance of the players within one group in a real effort task determined whether a player became a high-type or a low-type.
The real effort was introduced by a slider task (Gill and Prowse 2011, 2012) . We provide a screenshot in the appendix (Figure 4 ). The task is given by a single screen containing 48 sliders which players have to position exactly at 50 within a time frame of 180 seconds. For each slider, correctly positioned at the end of the time period, one point is allocated to the subject's point score. There was information on the own current point score and the amount of time remaining on the screen. Separated instructions for the slider task were transmitted via screen to the participants. Furthermore, we implemented a trial phase of 30 seconds at the beginning of the real effort task to make participants familiar with the slider task and avoid technical problems. After the real effort task was finished, the two subjects with the highest point score within one group became high-type players in the public goods game; the remaining two players became low-type players. Subjects were only informed about their own point score after the real effort task. If there was a tie, if necessary lots were drawn automatically by the computer to take the final decision. This happened in three out of 48 groups.
A session consisted of 12 rounds, including two practice rounds at the beginning. Individual earnings were chosen randomly out of one none-practice round at the end of the experiment and paid out confidentially. The exchange rate between Euro and LD was 1:2. Sessions, on average, lasted about 60 minutes with windfall allocations and about 70 minutes if the real effort task was part of the treatment. Subjects on average earned about 13 Euros. We did not pay any additional show-up fee. Table 2 reports average contributions and average profits for each treatment across all periods, and across the first and second half of the sessions. We further provide results of non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests (MW-U) in Table 4 . Moreover, Figure 2 and Figure 3 plot contribution behavior and profits over time. Further statistical evidence is given by a series of random effects regression models (see Table 6 and Table 8 ) which control for treatment differences, time effects and some socio-demographic variables (gender, lab experience, economics student y/n). Throughout the paper our discussion is primarily based on the nonparametric tests in order to avoid repetitions. We refer to the regression results only in cases where differences between the two statistical methods appear.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Initial insights into the respective treatments are best obtained by considering contribution behavior. Averaged over all periods (excluding trial periods) and agents, contributions are lowest in VCM under effort (4.3 tokens) and highest in an equal-payoff scheme under effort (9.6) (see Table 2 ). If we focus on the second part of the sessions (periods 6-10) the picture is even more pronounced: In the last 5 periods, average contributions decline to 2.9 in E-VCM and stabilize at 9.5 in E-eqpay. In general, as can be derived from Figure 2 , average contributions in our rule-based contribution schemes rather quickly stabilize after the first periods and tend to be successful in counteracting typical downward trends in contribution patterns in VCM over time. Further evidence for this observation is provided by our regression results (Table 6 , columns 1-3) and non-parametric tests on time trends (Table 7) : While contributions clearly decline in VCM over time (p<0.01), there is only weak statistical evidence for decreasing contributions in eqcont (both variants) and for R-eqpay (p<0.1). In an equal-payoff scheme with effort-based allocation our results do suggest contributions to be stable over time.
For the further discussion on the performance of rule-based mechanisms, we focus on the last 5 periods. The tables also report the results for the first 5 periods as wells as for averages across all 10 periods.
It is instructive to first consider the performance of rule-based mechanisms vs. VCM under random allocation as this can directly be linked to the results under heterogeneity with respect to marginal benefits as reported in Kesternich et al. (2014) . While Kesternich et al. (2014) find both equal-contribution and equal-payoff rule to lead to significantly larger contributions (and payoffs) than the VCM, we do not find such result when heterogeneous endowments are randomly allocated. Instead, the contribution averages in R-eqcont (7.6) and R-eqpay (6.5) are not significantly larger than in VCM (5.8) (MW-U, Table 4, see also regressions Table 6 , column 4). The different mechanisms have, however, distributional consequences:
contributions by low-type players are larger under R-eqcont than under R-eqpay (p<0.05, MW-U) and VCM (p<0.01, MW-U). This directly leads high-type players to have larger payoffs in R-eqcont than in the other two mechanisms (MW-U, p<0.01; mixed evidence in regressions Interestingly, the situation changes when considering an effort-based allocation. Here, average contributions in the last 5 periods in both burden sharing schemes (eqcont 6.6, eqpay 9.5) are significantly larger (at least p<0.1, MW-U, Table 4 , regressions Table 6 , p<0.05) than in VCM (2.9). The difference is driven by increased contributions from both players in eqcont (high:
7.5, low: 5.7) relative to VCM (high: 3.6, low: 2.3) (at least p<0.1), while particularly hightypes significantly (p<0.01) increase contributions under eqpay (high: 14.1, low: 5.0).
Consequently, both rule-based mechanisms significantly increase average payoffs and payoffs of low-types (at least p<0.1, MW-U; only obtained for eqpay in Table 6 , column 6: p<0.01).
High-types only have significantly larger payoffs under eqcont (p<0.01), these also being significantly larger than in eqpay (p<0.01). It is noteworthy that the benefits particularly accrue over time: non-parametric tests show a declining trend for payoffs in E-VCM for all player types (p<0.01, 7 As can be seen from Figure 3 , average profits rather tend to decline over time, most notably in the last 5 periods. The results of a nonparametric trend test (Table 8 ) also confirm this downward trend for all treatments under random allocation.
For effort-based allocations, Result 2 thus reestablishes the benefits from minimum contribution mechanisms that have been identified in the literature for homogeneous agents (Orzen 2008 , Dannenberg et al. 2010 ) and under heterogeneities with respect to benefits from the public good (Kesternich et al. 2014 Table 6 , columns 5,6), the difference is insignificant under effort-based allocation of endowments in
The rule-based mechanisms implement specific burden shares: for both random and effortbased allocations, the resulting contribution levels under eqcont do not differ across types, while high-types contribute significantly more than low-types in eqpay (p<0.01, postestimation in Table 6 , column 6). As such, it is instructive to have a closer look at how the allocation procedure changes the acceptance of the two implemented burden-sharing rules:
considering the endogenous burden sharing under VCM, one may expect an equal minimum contribution requirement (eqcont) to be better suited under effort-based allocation, while the stronger contribution requirements for high-types in eqpay might be more acceptable under random allocation. To investigate this, we consider two different indicators for the acceptance of the implemented burden-sharing rules: (i) the proposed minimum levels and (ii) voluntary contributions, defined by = − , i.e. contributions which go beyond the thereby determined individual minimum contribution levels.
The summary statistics for minimum proposals and voluntary contribution levels for the rulebased mechanisms are reported in Table 3 . Non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests on treatment effects are summarized in Table 5 . We again concentrate the discussion on the last 5 periods.
As derived in Section 2 and illustrated in Table 1 , in equal-contribution schemes payoffmaximizing high-type players are expected to make a group minimum contribution proposal of = 40, while low-types may suggest anything between 40 and 80, in fact leading to = = 10. Binding minimum group contribution levels in eqcont are lower under effort (20.9) than under random allocation (26.0) in our experimental data ( vs. 31.1). As such, the binding minimum group contribution levels in eqcont predominantly stem from high-type players under random allocation (71%), while low-types more often determine the binding minimum level under effort-based allocation (52%). Allocating endowments based on effort rather than randomly therefore appears to particularly decrease the proposals from low-types (p<0.05, Table 5 ). Considering the distribution of proposals allows gaining insights into possible motivation for this decline: under random allocation, 51% of low-type players' suggestions correspond to their (potentially) payoff maximizing group contribution level ( = 80), while less than 4% suggest a level which maximizes hightype players' payoffs ( = 40). Under effort-based endowment allocation, the rate of lowtype players suggestions at = 80 drops to 26%, while 13% of suggestions are at = 40.
This may indicate that low-type players tend to better accept larger payoffs to high-types at the expense of their own payoffs under effort-based allocation than under random allocation of endowments. In this sense, equal-contribution schemes appear to be accepted under effortbased allocations, even though this does not result increased total (minimum) contributions.
In the equal-payoff scheme, we expect both players to suggest = 80 in the payoff-dominant equilibrium. Both under random and effort allocation suggestions from low-types (random: proposals from low-types in eqcont are reduced relative to random allocation (p<0.05), while high-types tend to make larger proposals in eqpay under effort-based than under random allocation (though not significant). Consequently, under effort-based allocation, both player types tend to make larger proposals in E-eqpay than in E-eqcont (for low-types, p<0.1).
It is noteworthy that players voluntarily go beyond the minimum contribution requirement.
Under the equal-contribution rule, this applies particularly to high-type players (R-eqcont: 1.4, E-eqcont: 1.9), and less to low-types (R-eqcont: 0.7, E-eqcont: 0.8). Under equal-payoff rules, this is reversed such that voluntary contributions largely stem from low-types (R-eqpay: 0.7, E-eqpay: 1.1 for low-types vs. R-eqpay: 0.1, E-eqpay: 0.1 for high-types). As such, the equalcontribution rule appears to be seen as requiring disproportionately large contributions from low-types, while the equal-payoff rule may require too much from high-types.
We summarize our findings as follows:
Result 3. (i) No differences in the performance of the rules exist under random allocation, and only marginal differences exist under effort-based allocation, both with respect to minimum proposals as well as voluntary contributions. (ii) The allocation procedure does not significantly affect the efficiency reached under both rule-based mechanisms, while the efficiency of the VCM is inferior under effort-based relative to random allocation.
Our experiment therefore shows that while rule-based mechanisms, in particular the equalpayoff scheme, can increase contributions to a public good relative to a VCM under effortbased allocation of endowments, these gains are largely due to the mediocre performance of the VCM under effort-based allocation. As such, in particular the equal-payoff scheme can counter the failure of individuals to voluntary cooperate when their (endogenously determined) endowments differ. However, the equal-payoff rule lifts less than half of the possible efficiency gains across players (average contributions 9.5 vs. possible 20). While higher efficiency levels were reached in homogeneous settings (Orzen 2008 , Dannenberg et al. 2014 , the efficiency levels we identified under the equal-payoff scheme are similar to those found in Kesternich et al. (2014) under heterogeneities with respect to the marginal benefits from the public good (MPCR 0.3 and 0.7, for 2 low-and 2 high-types, respectively; endowment 20 tokens for all).
As a robustness check to this positive interpretation of our results for the equal-payoff rule under effort-based allocation, we finally discuss the results from the final treatment which introduces an additional dimension of heterogeneity: agents are both unequally endowed agents and differ with respect to their benefits from the public good. In contrast to the previous treatments, low-type players have a MPCR of 0.8 while benefits for high-type players remain at 0.4. Given our experimental setting, players are expected to coordinate towards the payoff-dominating equilibrium = 44 which would require = 10 and = 12 and = 35.2 and = 35.6. In this setting, equalizing payoffs at the same time would require nearly identical contributions from both types of players which may facilitate coordination in contrast to the homogeneous MPCR setting where redistribution of efficiency gains is addressed by requiring higher contributions from well-endowed agents. As depicted in Figure 1 , the payoff to high-type agents is relatively flat for changes in the minimum requirement, while low-type agents substantially benefit from increases in the binding group minimum level. For any given binding minimum, , both types can generate larger payoffs in E-eqpay-MPCR than in E-eqpay. However, we observe players on average to agree upon = 27.3 which is even below the proposals with homogeneous MPCRs in E-eqpay (35.7). In particular, high-type players make smaller suggestions, even though these differences and also those in contribution behavior are not significant. Comparing E-eqpay and E-eqpay-MPCR therefore shows that an increase in marginal benefits does not necessarily enhance coordination, even though the distribution scheme is designed such that both players benefit. This final treatment thereby further indicates that heterogeneities among players may obscure the performance of specific rule-based mechanisms, potentially because players have different views on what constitutes a fair distribution.
CONCLUSIONS
The (voluntary) provision of public goods relies on effective ways to limit free-riding behavior. When the relevant agents are heterogeneous, for example with respect to endowment or benefits from the public good, questions arise on how to share the burden of the provision of the public good. The perception of fair distributions interacts with issues regarding procedural fairness, i.e. under which circumstances and how these different positions are determined.
In this paper, we experimentally test different rule-based contribution mechanisms in a repeated 4-player public goods game and compare them to a VCM. In our experimental setting, the players differ in their individual endowments. With this, we provide a robustness check and extend the existing literature that concentrates on homogeneous players or on heterogeneous benefits from the public good.
We find that endowment heterogeneities limit the efficiency gains from minimum contribution rules, in particular under random allocation. Here, they just appear to redistribute voluntary contributions that even would occur under a VCM. Under effort-based allocations, however, the schemes generate substantial efficiency gains relative to a VCM. These efficiency gains can in particular be obtained with a scheme that aims at harmonizing payoffs, consistent with findings in Kesternich et al. (2014) . However, the improvements relative to VCM appear to be largely driven by an even worse performance of the VCM than under random allocation as players with high endowment reduce their contributions. Our results therefore show that the procedure how allocations are distributed indeed has an impact on the potential benefits from using minimum mechanisms, but not necessarily through affecting the efficiency of the different rule-based mechanisms themselves. However, endowment heterogeneity appears to substantially limit lifting the potential efficiency gains under rulebased mechanisms. This also holds when low-endowed agents disproportionally benefit from contributions to the public good.
Our results indicate that heterogeneities (randomly or effort-based induced) may induce differing views on what agents perceive as a fair distribution, thereby limiting the coordination under a given allocation procedure. In this paper, we concentrated on the equalpayoff and the equal-contribution schemes only. Clearly, other distribution schemes may improve upon the performance of the rule-based mechanism, for example a rule which distributes burdens proportional to endowment. Furthermore it is worthwhile to explore if an endogenous choice of the specific burden sharing rule may lead to further efficiency gains.
We leave these questions to further research. Note: = average contributions: per group ( ), for low-types ( ) and for high-types ( ), = average profits: per group ( ), for lowtypes ( ) and for high-types ( ) 
LITERATURE APPENDIX
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Period 1-10 Period 6-10
Reqpay Eeqpay R-VCM E-VCM Reqcont Eeqcont Reqpay Eeqpay qL
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According to a MW-U test, the null hypothesis states that the median of two independent groups is equal. In our case, the average of the minimum of the minimum contribution proposal per group over all periods or in the last 5 periods serve as one observation. We compare rows with columns. *p<0.1, **p<0.05. Example: average min(Qmin) of low-type players over all periods in R-eqcont are higher than in Eeqcont, this difference is significant at the 5%-level.
Definition of variables q i
Individual contribution of subject i to the public good profit Subject i's profit eqcont = 1 if subject i played treatment R-eqcont/E-eqcont, 0 else eqpay = 1 if subject i played treatment R-eqpay/E-eqpay, 0 else MPCReqpay = 1 if subject i played treatment E-MPCR-eqpay, 0 else per6_10 = 1 for the last 5 periods, 0 else per6_10Xeqcont = 1 for the last 5 periods and played R-eqcont/E-eqcont, 0 else per6_10Xeqcont = 1 for the last 5 periods and played R-eqpay/E-eqpay, 0 else per6_10XMPCReqpay = 1 for the last 5 periods and played E-MPCR-eqpay, 0 else eff = 1 if endowment was allocated based on real effort task, 0 else effX*burden sharing rule* = 1 under effort allocation and played *burden sharing rule*, 0 else high = 1 if subject i is a high-type player, 0 else highX*burden sharing rule* = 1 if subject i is a high-type player and played *burden sharing rule*, 0 else highXeff = 1 if subject i is a high-type player and effort allocation of endowments highXeff*burden sharing rule* = 1 if subject i is a high-type player and effort allocation of endowments and subject i played *burden sharing rule*, 0 else male = 1 if subject i is male, 0 if female exp number of experiments subject i has taken part in MaXLab eco = 1 if subject i is economics student, 0 else
Estimation strategy:
We report results from using a random-effects Feasible Generalized Least Square estimator (RE FGLS) for determining differences in individual contributions and payoffs. 2 individuals had to be removed from the econometric analysis due to missing sociodemographic information. Moreover, the discussion of the regression results throughout the paper is based on standard errors computed at individual levels. This approach explicitly considers individual heterogeneity across participants. For robustness check, we further applied pooled FGLS regressions without explicitly modeling of the individual heterogeneity but allowing the error terms of observations from one single individual to be correlated over time. We specified the model in a way that error correlation declines as the time differences between observations increase. That is, the decision behavior of the current period may be influenced by some effects from past periods (that do not enter the regression as explanatory variables) but this effect lowers if time lags increase. In the FGLS random effect model, error correlation can only be captured by clustering observations on the individual level without accounting for declining error correlation over time. We apply a AR(2) approach which adequately fits to the error correlation observed after running a standard OLS regression.
For estimating contribution decisions, we further run a panel Tobit model. This estimator controls for the fact that the dependent variable (individual contributions to the public good) may be left-censored with a known lower limit of 0 (28.71% of all contribution decisions). We do not specify an upper limit since endowments vary across individuals. Specification tests suggest the Tobit model not to be sensitive to the number of quadrature points used in the estimation process. Similar to the regression on payoffs, results for contribution behavior in the pooled model are similar to the random effects model. We therefore do not include these results in the paper but provide the tables upon request. We consider individual level random effects, i.e. one observation for one individual corresponds to the panel variable and the period sets the time variable: 334 individual observations x 10 periods (columns 4-6: 5 periods) = 3,340 (1,670) total observations. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for group clusters, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 high-type ▼*** ▼*** ▼** Note: Average contributions per (sub-)group in each of the ten periods of the game serve as one observation. Jonckheere-Terpstra for ordered differences of a response variable among classes, the null hypothesis states that the distribution of the frequency of a given contribution level does not differ among rounds. ▼:= decreasing profits over time, := increasing profits over time,* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 We consider individual level random effects, i.e. one observation for one individual corresponds to the panel variable and the period sets the time variable: 334 individual observations x 10 periods (last two columns: 5 periods) = 3,340 (1,670) total observations, robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for group clusters, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 9 : Time trends in profits over time Treatment 
R-VCM E-VCM R-eqcont E-eqcont R-eqpay E-eqpay MPCR-E-eqpay
All players ▼*** ▼*** ▼* ▼* ▼* low-type ▼*** ▼*** ▼** high-type ▼* ▼*** Note: Average profits per (sub-)group in each of the ten periods of the game serve as one observation. Statistical results for time trends are based on a non-parametric Jonckheere-Terpstra for ordered differences of a response variable among classes, the null hypothesis states that the distribution of the frequency of a given profit level does not differ among rounds. ▼:= decreasing profits over time, := increasing profits over time,* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 ( In the laboratory experiment you are taking part in, you can win money depending on your decisions and the decisions of your fellow players. Your payoff from the experiment will be calculated in LabDollars (LD). The conversion rate between € and LD is 1:2, i.e. 1 LD are 0.50 €. All your decisions made in the experiment will remain anonymous. Only the experimenter will know your identity, but your data will be treated confidentially.
[Additional paragraph for effort based allocation of endowments:
The experiment consists of an earning stage (stage 1) and a game (stage 2). In order to become familiar with the game, please read the following instructions. Thereafter you will get additional information on the earning stage via screen.]
Rules of the game
Now you will learn more about the rules of the game you will be participating in. Altogether 4 players take part in the game, so besides you there are 3 more players. The group of 4 players has an initial endowment of 80 points. Two players have an initial endowment of 10 points each ("low-type") and two players have an initial endowment of 30 points each ("high-type").
[Additional paragraph for random allocation of endowments:
There will be a random draw whether you are a low-or a high-type.]
[Additional paragraph for effort-based allocation of endowments:
Whether you are a low-or a high-type agent will be depend on your effort in the earning stage before the game that is described in the following starts]
Your task in the game, and also your fellow players' task, is to decide how many points you would like to contribute to a joint project. Your contribution, q, can be set between 0 and 10 points (only integer numbers) if you are a low-type agent or between 0 and 30 points (only integer numbers) if you are a high-type agent.
Your individual and also your fellow players' payoff will be calculated as follows: 
MPCR-eqpay
Your individual and also your fellow players' payoff will be calculated as follows:
Your payoff = (E − your contribution to the project) + b·(sum of all contributions of all players to the project)
The factor b is b = 0.8 for low-types and b = 0.4 for high-types.
Assuming you to be a low-type: Your payoff (in LD) will be calculated as follows: The information, whether you are a low-or a high-type will be displayed on your screen.
[Additional paragraph in
eqcont:
There are two stages in this game. In stage 1 you choose a minimum contribution, Q min ≥ 0 , that should be contributed to the joint by the group as a whole. Simultaneously, all other players make their suggestions on a minimum contribution level, Q min . The minimum of the suggested levels, min(Q min ), is then decisive for contributions in the second stage. In stage 2 you decide on your contribution, q, to the joint project, thereby keeping in mind that for each player an individual minimum contribution level, q min , will be calculated from min(Q min ) such that each player has to contribute at least a quarter of the minimum contribution level of the group, i.e. q ≥ 0.25 · min(Q min ). Please keep in mind that low-types cannot contribute more than 10 LD such that high-types may contribute more to achieve the minimum group contribution level.
eqpay:
There are two stages in this game. In stage 1 you decide on the minimum contribution, Q min, that should be contributed to the joint project by the group as a whole. Simultaneously, all other players make their suggestions on a group minimum contribution level, Q min . The minimum of the suggested levels, min(Q min ), is then decisive for contributions in the second stage. In stage 2 you decide on your contribution, q, to the joint project, thereby keeping in mind that for each player an individual minimum contribution level, q min , will be calculated from min(Q min ). The implementation of these individual minimum contributions, q min , yields to equal payoffs or at least to a harmonization of payoffs. Please note that the harmonization of payoffs is subject to the constraint that Q min will be achieved.
An example: If the minimum group contribution level is Q min = 64 low-type players are bound to an individual minimum contribution of q min = 6 and high-type agents face q min = 26. Assuming these contribution levels, the payoff for each player would be 29.6 LD. If, however, Q min = 20, minimum contribution for high-types is q min = 10 and for low-types q min = 0. The payoff for a high-type subject would be 28 LD and for a low-type subject would amount 18 LD.
MPCR-eqpay:
An example: If the minimum group contribution level is Q min = 24 low-type players are bound to an individual minimum contribution of q min = 1 and high-type agents face q min =11. Assuming these contribution levels, the payoff for a high-type subject would be 26.2 LD and for a low-type subject would amount 25.8 LD. If, however, Q min = 64, minimum contribution for high-types is q min = 22 and for low-types q min = 10. The payoff for a high-type subject would be 27.2 LD and for a low-type subject would amount 44.8 LD.
]
The game consists of 10 separate rounds in each of which you will play the same two-stage game remaining the same type. The three other players you will interact with will be the same in every round. In every round you decide how many points, q you would like to contribute to the joint project. In each round you will receive information on individual contributions (q 1 to q 4 ), payoffs (Payoff 1 to Payoff 4 ) and [in eqcont and eqpay: minimum contribution proposals (Q min1 to Q min4 )] for all your group members and average levels (D).
If the experiment is complete you will receive the payoff of one of the rounds in € (according to the conversion rate stated above). The round to be paid out will be determined randomly. This means you should behave in each round as if it were the round relevant for payoff. In the beginning, two trial rounds will be played which are not relevant for payoff.
Control questions
If you have read the instructions and do not have any questions, please answer the following control questions:
[Additional question in eqcont Please assume that the four players suggested 4, 16, 52 and 72 as minimum contribution levels for the group as a whole to the joint project. Please indicate the range of your possible contribution levels to the joint project.
More than _____ and less than or equal _____ Is it possible that the minimum contribution rule forces players to contribute more than their own minimum contribution suggestions?
O yes O no eqpay Please assume that calculating individual minimum contribution levels, q min , leads to 2 for each of the two low-type players and to 22 for the two high-type players respectively. Please indicate the range of your possible contribution levels to the joint project if you are a lowtype.
More than _____ and less than or equal _____
MPCR-eqpay
Please assume that calculating individual minimum contribution levels, q min , leads to 1 for each of the two low-type players and to 11 for the two high-type players respectively. Please indicate the range of your possible contribution levels to the joint project if you are a lowtype.
More than _____ and less than or equal _____ ] Please assume that your contribution as a high-type to the joint project is 20 points. The contributions of the three other group members are 0, 10 and 30. What is your payoff?
My payoff is _______ Please assume that your contribution as a low-type to the joint project is 0 points. 
